The board of directors of Oregon's public employee retirement system voted 3-to-1 Friday to change its rules to allow the public disclosure of members' individual benefits.

The administrative rule change reflects a legal settlement that PERS reached earlier this year to release benefit information to The Oregonian and the Statesman Journal in Salem on Nov. 21 for 110,000 individual retirees.

The PERS Board was quick to note the release is still contingent on a hearing Monday in Marion County Circuit Court, where a group of retirees has filed a class-action lawsuit seeking to prevent release of the information.

"It's out of our hands -- above our pay grade," said James Dalton, a former technology executive who chairs the PERS Board. "It's in the court system and we'll abide" by what the court determines.

The Oregonian has long sought access to such information as part of its reporting on the retirement system's costs and financial difficulties. PERS previously released individually identifiable pension benefits, but started denying requests for such information on all but the most prominent public employees in 2002, saying the information was exempt from public records laws.

Attorney General John Kroger changed that course last October, ordering the agency to release individually identifiable benefit information to the two newspapers.

Pat West, a former Salem firefighter who sits on the PERS board, was the lone vote against the rule change. He said he opposed the data release, which he contends could make retirees marks for financial scams.

The rule change was administrative to align policy with the settlement, and has no bearing on whether the data is releasable, board members said. But they were heavily lobbied by retirees to vote against it.

The Oregonian has intervened in the employees' lawsuit. Its lawyer, Portland attorney Charles Hinkle, says he hasn't seen issues related to the release of similar data in other states, and is confident the court will agree with the Attorney General.
 

(1) whether the entity performs a governmental function;

(2) the extent of government funding;

(3) the extent of government control over the entity; and

(4) whether the entity was created by legislative act.

Those factors are then applied under a "totality of the circumstances" test to determine if the entity is the functional equivalent of an agency. Applying the factors, the Tennessee Supreme Court on February 28, 2011 found that IMEF was not the functional equivalent of an agency. As a result, IMEF was not subject to that state's PRA.

Washington's Public Records Act, at Chapter 42.56 RCW, similarly may be applied to an entity when found to be the functional equivalent of an agency. See Telford v. Thurston County Board of Commissioners, 95 Wash.App. 149, 974 P.2d 886 (1999). In Telford, the Court of Appeals held that while the Washington State Association of Counties (WSAC) and the Washington Association of County Officials (WACO) were not agencies as such, they were the “functional equivalent” of agencies and therefore subject to the campaign finance provisions of the Washington Public Disclosure Act. The court in Telford did not address the separate provisions of the Public Disclosure Act relating to public records (now, the Washington Public Records Act). And, the decision did not address other entities similar to WSAC and WACO.

In 2002, the Washington Attorney General issued a formal opinion in response to an inquiry regarding the Association of Washington Cities (AWC) and other organizations. See AGO 2002 No. 2 (April 10, 2002). In that formal Opinion, the Attorney General examined whether entities whose membership includes public agencies were separately subject to the Public Records Act. The opinion examined the Telford analysis (factors similar to those applied by the Tennessee Court), but concluded that any application of the statute to “AWC in a public records context must await the development of an actual factual situation to which the principles set forth in the statute, as interpreted in Telford, might be applied.”

Subsequent Washington cases have reached divergent results, based primarily on the extent of an entity's government funding and governmental authority. For example, in Spokane Research & Defense Fund v. West Central Community Dev. Ass’n, 133 Wn. App. 602 (2006), the court found that a contract vendor in a city park was not the functional equivalent of a public agency. But, in Clarke v. Tri-Cities Animal Care and Control Shelter, 144 Wn. App. 185 (2008), the court found a non-profit entity providing enforcement of animal control laws under contract with city and county governments was the functional equivalent of an agency.
 

Nearly a year in the making, the amended terms alter Facebook's standard terms as applied to state and local governments utilizing Facebook Pages for official use. Facebook Pages are different from the average individual person’s profile in that they are intended to promote businesses and other commercial, political, or charitable endeavors. The agreement, already in effect and applied retroactively to governments with an existing Facebook presence, eliminates Facebook’s choice of venue and governing law clauses while limiting a government agency’s indemnification of Facebook for the agency’s actions to the extent permitted in the agency’s jurisdiction. In Washington, the site’s general indemnification terms, protecting Facebook from “claims related to [a government’s] actions, content or information on Facebook,” may apply to local governments and state agencies as these entities generally have authority to contract for indemnification.

While this agreement resolves some issues facing governments interested in developing a social media presence, there will likely be continued growing pains as bureaucratic organizations deal with the increasingly complex electronic world. Local governments will continue to manage concerns on many social media fronts, including public records in cyberspace and user comments on Facebook and Twitter posts.

An action commenced and the trial court and Court of Appeals agreed with the Attorney General. On December 3, 2010, the Supreme Court reversed, holding “a disclosure of state employee birth dates would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy and therefore exempted from disclosure” under the Texas public disclosure law.

In its consideration, the Supreme Court made specific reference to the public harm caused by identity theft and that the availability of birth dates may facilitate identity theft. The Texas Supreme Court noted other decisions, particularly court decisions under the Federal Freedom of Information Act, that “birth dates implicate substantial privacy interests.”

The Open Public Meetings Act requires that notice be properly given of a meeting of the governing body. This requirement is not satisfied by notice given for a meeting of a standing committee of a city council as a governing body, where a quorum of members of the city council attend the meeting and take action as defined in the act, such that a meeting of the city council as a governing body takes place.

A reference to the Attorney General Opinion follows: http://www.atg.wa.gov/AGOOpinions/Opinion.aspx?section=archive&id=26916

Particularly important to note is that discussion by a committee may be an “action” under the OPMA definitions. As a result, a better practice for an agency that uses committees (whose meetings are subject to the Open Public Meetings Act) is to include as part of meeting notice (in adopted code, resolution or otherwise) that the committee meeting is also a meeting of the legislative body (e.g., city council). An additional report on the Opinion is at http://www.pnwlocalnews.com/whidbey/wnt/news/111228679.html.
 

Since Justice Sanders of the Washington Supreme Court was the appellant, he recused himself, as did Justice Alexander. The Supreme Court decision was unanimous, authored by Justice Stephens.

The case involved Justice Sanders’ request for all documents held by the State in relation to his visit to McNeil Island. That visit resulted in a subsequent disciplinary proceeding against the Justice. Justice Sanders demanded that the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) release numerous additional documents the AGO had withheld as exempt. The Justice also sought the release of all the documents on grounds that the AGO had waived any exemption by not strictly complying with the PRA requirement that the government agency “explain” the basis for any claimed exemption. Justice Sanders also asked for penalties and attorney fees under the Act.

The trial court in Thurston County ruled in favor of Justice Sanders on some, but not all his claims and assessed a monetary penalty of $55,442.12 against the AGO for withholding some documents. Justice Sanders was also awarded 37.5% of his attorney fees. The Supreme Court essentially affirmed the trial court decision – but in a wide ranging opinion of its own.

The aspect of the ruling that will probably have the most far-reaching effect on Washington agency responses to public records requests is the Supreme Court’s ruling that an agency must not only specify the exemption on which the agency relies, but also provide for each document a “brief explanation of how the exemption applies to the record withheld.” Just specifying the exemption, the Court reasoned, would make the explanation requirement of RCW 42.56.210(3) superfluous.

The Court, however, did not agree with Justice Sanders that the failure of the AGO to adhere to this explanation requirement acted to waive the exemption. But it did affirm the trial court’s addition of a $3 per day penalty – in addition to the $5 per day underlying penalty – for not providing the explanation. The Court also ruled that the additional time when documents are withheld because of pending litigation, counts as additional days of penalty. The Court noted that those additional days in court are days, just like any other, where the requestor does not have access to documents that should have been released.
 

To view a copy of the notice of the pending opinion request, click HERE.

The case involves the attempt to seek release of the names of people who signed a referendum petition to require a public vote to overturn the legislature’s enactment of Washington’s “everything but marriage act.”  The Secretary of State was poised to release the names, when a group named “Protect Marriage Washington” and two individual signatories to the referendum petition (John Doe #1 and #2) sought a preliminary injunction in Federal District Court to stop the release.  The District enjoined the release finding that it would impinge on First Amendment rights.  The Ninth Circuit heard expedited review of that ruling and reversed the decision on October 15, 2009 – before the election. Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2009).  Four days later, however, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the Ninth Circuit ruling, reinstated the District Court’s preliminary injunction and accepted review. Doe v. Reed, No. 09-559.

The Washington Attorney General  will argue the case tomorrow on behalf of the State’s Secretary of State,  and urge the Supreme Court to affirm the Ninth Circuit ruling.  The State’s position is that when people sign a referendum petition to substitute their view for that of the Governor and Legislature, they are engaging in a public legislative process and have no expectation of privacy when they sign such a referendum petition. 

More information about the Task Force can be obtained on the Attorney General’s web page and on the Washington State Auditors Office web page.